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Abstract—It is generally admitted that Inter-domain peering
links represent nowadays the main bottleneck of the Internet,
particularly because of lack of coordination between providers,
which use independent and “selfish” routing policies. We are
interested in identifying possible “light” coordination strategies,
that would allow carriers to better control their peering links,
while preserving their independence and respective interests. We
propose a robust multi-path routing coordination framework for
peering carriers, which relies on the MED attribute of BGP as
signalling medium. Our scheme relies on a game theoretic mo-
delling, with a non-cooperative potential game considering both
routing and congestions costs. Peering Equilibrium MultiPath
(PEMP) coordination policies can be implemented by selecting
Pareto-superior Nash equilibria at each carrier. We compare
different PEMP policies to BGP Multipath schemes by emulating
a realistic peering scenario. Our results show that the routing
cost can be decreased by roughly 10% with PEMP. We also show
that the stability of routes can be significantly improved and that
congestion can be practically avoided on the peering links1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multipath routing has received interest for a long time, as
it is considered as a very efficient solution providing more
robustness and better load distribution on the network. Intra-
domain multipath routing is commonly performed in Interior
Gateway Protocol (IGP) networks, by balancing the load over
Equal Cost Multiple Paths (ECMP) [1]. In the multi-domain
context, multi-path routing is generally not implemented,
its introduction raising important scalability and complexity
issues (see eg. [2]). Multipath interdomain routing is, to our
knowledge, still an open issue (and a target for future internet
architectures). However, some limited solutions based on the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) have been introduced, at least
with some vendor’s routers (see e.g. [3] [4]). Multipath BGP
can then be used to balance load on different routes under
specific conditions (detailed in the next section), in particular
on several peering links between two adjacent carriers.
Nevertheless, the lack of routing collaboration among neigh-
boring carriers causes BGP Multipath to produce unilateral
routing choices that, even if potentially efficient for the ups-
tream carrier w.r.t. load distribution, may lead to an inefficient
situation for the downstream carrier. In this paper we propose a
framework that allow carriers to select efficient load balancing
strategies in a coordinated manner, while preserving their
independence and respective interests. Our proposal is based
on a game theoretical model, as a natural tool to study possible
trade-offs between selfishness and cooperation. Possible coor-
dination policies can be highlighted, from quite selfish to more
cooperative ones, with different degrees of Pareto-efficiency.
1Work funded by the European ICT FP7 Euro-NF Network of Excellence
and the I-GATE project of the Institut Telecom, ICF Networks of the Future.
We propose to re-use the Multiple Exit Discriminator
(MED) attribute of BGP as the simple medium to convey co-
ordination costs between carriers. A potential non-cooperative
game that arises from load balancing based upon this data is
then proposed. Pareto-efficient equilibrium solutions can be
coordinatively selected by carriers. We show by simulations
that this choice prevents congestion on peering links, decreases
the global routing cost while increasing the route stability.
Sect. II presents the inter-carrier routing issues that we
tackle. Sect. III present the ClubMED (Coordinated MED)
framework for inter-domain multipath routing over peering
links. We explain how load balancing shall be implemented
over efficient equilibrium strategies. Sect. IV defines the
Peering Equilibrium MultiPath (PEMP) routing coordination
policies and discuss their possible benefits and technical
implementation issues. Sect. V presents results from realistic
simulations assessing the PEMP policy performance. We show
how our approach can outperform BGP Multipath in terms
of routing cost, route stability and peering link congestion.
Sect. VI concludes the paper and discusses further work.
II. INTER-CARRIER ROUTING ISSUES
A. BGP and selfish routing
It is worth briefly reminding how the route selection is
performed via BGP [5]. When multiple paths to a destination
network are available, a cascade of criteria is employed to
compare them. The first is the “local preference” through
which local policies with neighbor Autonomous Systems
(ASs), mainly guided by economic issues, can be applied:
e.g., a peering link (i.e., free transit) is preferred to a transit
link (transit fees). The subsequent criteria incorporate purely
operational network issues to select the best route: (i) the route
with a smaller AS hop count; (ii) if the routes are received by
the same neighbor AS, the route with a smaller MED; (iii) the
route with the closer egress point (“hot-potato” rule), using as
distance metric the IGP path cost; (iv) the more recent route;
(v) the AS path learned by the router with the smaller IP
(“tie-breaking” rule). Considering these criteria, BGP selects
the best route. This best route is then eventually advertised to
its peers (if not filtered by local policies).
Two peering ASs have usually many links in several dis-
tributed locations and can thus dispose of many routes to
the same network through the same AS. By default, these
routes have equal local preferences and AS hop counts. Hence,
the best route is chosen w.r.t. either the smaller MED or
(if the MED is disabled) the smaller IGP path cost. The
decision is taken minimizing the routing cost of a single peer:
either the upstreaming AS’s IGP path cost (hot-potato), or the
downstreaming AS’s weight (smaller MED). The challenge is
thus the definition of methods that consider both the routing
costs when taking the peering routing decision.
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The Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED): The MED is a metric
that an AS can attach to route advertisements toward a poten-
tial upstream AS, to suggest an entry point when many exist.
In this way, the upstream AS can prefer an entry point toward
the advertised network. By default, the MED is set to the
corresponding intra-AS IGP path cost (from the downstream
border router to the egress router). On transit links, subject
to provider/customer agreements, the provider should always
follow “MED-icated” routes suggesting preferred entry points
because the customers pay for. This is not the case for peering
settlements, and this can be considered as the main reason why
the MED is often disabled between peers [6].
BGP Multipath: If the MEDs and/or the IGP path costs
are equal, to avoid tie-breaking the load may be balanced
on the equivalent routes. At the time being, such multipath
extensions for BGP did not find consensus at the IETF, and for
this reason there is no standard specification. However, some
suggestions are indicated in [7]. As of our knowledge, the
only implemented method carriers can use for multipath inter-
domain routing is the “BGP Multipath” mode that some router
vendors now provide (e.g., Juniper [3] and Cisco [4]), with
some little variations on the routing decision. Therefore, BGP
Multipath allows adding multiple paths to the same destination
in the routing table. This does not affect the best path selection:
a router still designates a single best path and advertises it to its
neighbors. More precisely, BGP Multipath can be used when
more than one IBGP (Internal BGP) routers have equivalent
routes to a destination through many border routers, or when
all of the candidates routes are learned via EBGP (External
BGP). As stated in [7], other cases, with a combination of
routes learned from IBGP and EBGP peers, should be avoided,
as they may lead to routing loops for instance.
B. BGP route deflection
The peering routing decision with BGP thus relies on IGP
routing costs. Nowadays, the interaction between IGP routing
and inter-AS routing represents a major issue because IGP
weights are optimized and reconfigured automatically. To react
to non-transient network events, a carrier may re-optimize the
IGP weights, inducing changes in the BGP routing decision,
so that congestions might appear where not expected.
Many works concern BGP route deflection control methods.
[8] reformulates the egress routing problem and proposes
to replace the hot-potato rule with a more expressive and
efficient rule. [9] presents a comprehensive yet hard IGP
Weight Optimization (IGP-WO) method aware of possible hot-
potato route deflections to bound them (they report that 70% of
traffic can be affected in a real network). [10] presents a similar
proposition relying on graph expansion tricks. However, while
effective, a problem seems to persist with the latter proposi-
tions: each time the BGP routes change, the BGP-aware IGP-
WO is to be triggered. The scalability may be thus a practical
issue: the occurrence of IGP-WOs, normally triggered only for
intra-AS issues, would drastically increase. To better assess
this issue, we worked at the detection of deflections using
TRACETREE radar data [11]. Preliminary results confirm that
top-tier AS interconnections suffer from frequent deflections,
and some periodic oscillations [12]. The challenge is thus the
definition of methods to control the coupling between inter-
AS and intra-AS routing, as the authors in [13] conclude after
studying these interactions.
C. Peering link congestion
It should also be noted that the incentives for increasing
the capacities of peering links are not straightforward. Indeed,
peering agreements do not relay on any payment, as opposed
to transit agreement. Controlling the load on the peering links
is thus essential. However, this is difficult, as it requires to set-
up very complex routing policies [2]. Furthermore, the current
inability to estimate possible IGP weight variations, and thus
to foresee the associated inter-domain route deflections they
might cause, prevents carriers from controlling the inter-AS
link congestion precisely. Whenever available, Multipath BGP
is expected to reduce congestion, by better distributing the
load over the different available routes (through the different
peering links) with the same IGP costs. However, the choice
of routes on which to distribute the load is based on internal
costs, which might lead to inefficient traffic distribution for the
peer’s network. The challenge is thus the definition of scalable
peering link control methods, with some collaboration.
III. THE CLUBMED FRAMEWORK
We present the ClubMED (Coordinated MED) framework,
characterized in detail in [14]. Within it the MED signalling
between peering ASs is modeled as a non-cooperative peering
game that can allows the peers to coordinate towards rational,
efficient and stable multipath routing solutions.
A. The ClubMED peering game
The idea is to re-use the MED as the means to exchange
loose routing and link congestion costs between peer networks
for a subset of destination prefixes, in order to help carriers to
better collaborate in the load sharing decisions. The scheme
relies on a game theoritical modeling of the load sharing
problem. Each peer is represented as a rational player that
can take benefit by routing accordingly to a cost game built
upon routing and congestion costs. The principle is to take
the peering routing decision following efficient equilibrium
strategy profiles of the game - in its one-shot form or repeated
form - thus allowing better collaboration between carriers.
We can introduce the game on a simple example, depicted
in Fig. 1, with two peers, AS I and AS II. Let us first define
a destination cone as a set of customers’ destination prefixes.
On Fig. 1, Community A and Community B represent two
critical destination cones that may deserve careful peer routing,
e.g. because they produce high bit-rate flow aggregates. The
inter-cone flows are supposed to be equivalent, for instance
w.r.t. their bandwidth, so that their path cost can be fairly
compared and their routing coordinated. We assume that the
cones represent direct customers or stub ASs, which would
often assure that their entry point in a peer network is unique
(this would reinforce the equivalence condition of the two
flows, but is not, however, a strict requirement).
We propose that the two ASs coordinate the choice on the
egress peering link for each outgoing flow, from Community A
to Community B and vice-versa. A “ClubMED peering game”
is built at Ra and Rb routers, called ClubMED nodes, using
the egress IGP path cost, the ingress IGP path cost, the same
costs for the peer announced via the MED, and endogenously-
set peering link congestion costs. At ClubMED nodes, efficient
equilibria can be selected, accordingly to the different policies
detailed in the next section, so as to decide the egress route(s)
for each inter-community flow.
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Fig. 1. Single-pair ClubMED interaction example.
In order to take broader decisions, many pairs of inter-cone
flows shall be considered in a same ClubMED game. In this
way, the equivalence condition (e.g., on the bandwidth) can
be extended to all the pairs together, not necessarily related
to a same couple of ClubMED nodes. Therefore, the final
ClubMED game derives from the superposition of many inter-
community flows (e.g. in Fig.2 we have 4 pairs and 8 flows).
With multiple pairs of cones, carriers shall control the
congestion on inter-peer links. The more egress flows are
routed on a peering link, the more loaded the link and the
congestion risk, and the higher the routing cost. Hence, we aim
at weighting the inter-carrier links with congestion costs when
congestion may arise. This could be alternatively done by
modeling the inter-peer link in IGP-WO operations (e.g. [10]),
but this would violate, however, the requirement of decoupling
intra-domain from inter-domain routing [13].
1) Notations: The ClubMED game can be described as
G = Gs + Gd + Gc, sum of a selfish game, a dummy game
and a congestion game, respectively, as depicted in Fig. 2.
Let X and Y be the set of strategies available to AS I and
AS II (resp.): each strategy indicates the peering link where
to route each inter-community flow. Let (φ(x, y), ψ(x, y)) be
the strategy cost vector for the the strategy profile (x, y),
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y . E.g., in Fig. 2, we have 4 pairs
(A1↔B1,A1↔B2,A2↔B1,A2↔B2) and 2 links (l1,l2), and
X and Y become {l1l1l1l1, l1l1l1l2, ..., l2l2l2l2}. For m pairs
and n links, the game is the repeated permutation of m single-
pair n-link games, thus with |X|=|Y |=nm. Gs considers egress
IGP weights only, modeling a sort of extended hot-potato rule.
Gd considers ingress IGP weights only, impacted by the other
peer’s routing decision (not taken into account in the legacy
BGP decision process). Gc considers peering link congestion
costs computed as explained hereafter.
Let cIji and c
II
ji be the egress IGP weight from the j
th
ClubMED node of AS I and AS II to the ith peering link li,
i ∈ E, |E|=n. Let cIij∗ and cIIij ∗ be the corresponding ingress
weights, from the ith link to the jth ClubMED node.
Gs = (X,Y ; fs, gs), is a purely endogenous game, where
fs, gs : X×Y → N are the cost functions for AS I and AS II
(resp.). In particular, fs(x, y) = φs(x), where φs : X → N,
and gs(x, y) = ψs(y), where ψs : Y → N. E.g., for the
topology in Fig. 2, consider the profile (x+, y+) with x+ =
l1l2l1l1 and y+ = l1l1l1l2; we have:





Fig. 2. Multi-pair 2-link ClubMED game composition example.





Gd = (X,Y ; fd, gd), is a game of pure externality, where
fd, gd : X × Y → N, fd(x, y) = φd(y) and φd : Y → N,
gd(x, y) = ψd(x) and ψd : X → N. For the above example:









Gc = (X,Y ; fc, gc) is an endogenous game too, where
fc, gc : X × Y → N. fc(x, y) = φc(x) and gc(x, y) = ψc(y).
In order to build the congestion game, the flow bit-rates have
to be known. Let H be the set of inter-peer flow pairs, ρh the
outgoing flow bitrate of the pair h ∈ H , and Ci the egress
available capacity of li. With multipath, ρh can be partioned,
and ρih is the fraction routed towards li. Gc should not count
when
∑
h∈H ρh  mini∈E{Ci}, otherwise it would affect
the G equilibrium selection. The congestion cost is to be
monotonically increasing with the number of flows routed on


















h, Ki = ∞. Otherwise, Ki are constants to
be scaled to make the cost comparable to IGP costs, e.g., such
that it is 1 when the idle capacity is maximum, i.e., Ki = Ci.
2) Peering Nash equilibrium: Gs +Gc is a cardinal poten-
tial game [17], i.e., the incentive to change players’ strategy
can be expressed in one potential function, and the difference
in individual costs by an individual strategy move has the
same value as the potential difference. Gd can be seen as
a potential game too, but with null potential. Hence, the G
potential P : X × Y → N depends on Gs and Gc only. As
property of potential games [17], the P minimum corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium and always exists. The inverse is not
necessarily true, but it can be easily proven that for G it is
thanks to the endogenous nature of Gs and Gc. The ClubMED
peering Nash equilibrium is thus guided by the egress IGP
weights and the congestion costs, and may be not unique when
their sum is equal over different strategies.
The opportunity of minimizing of the potential function
to catch all the peering Nash equilibria represents a key ad-
vantage. It decreases the equilibrium computation complexity,
which would have been very high for instances with many
links and pairs. When there are multiple equilibria, Gd can
help in avoiding inefficient solutions (e.g. due to tie-breaking)
by the selection of an efficient equilibrium in the Pareto-sense.
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3) Pareto-efficiency: A strategy profile p is Pareto-superior
to another profile p′ if a player’s cost can be decreased
from p to p′ without increasing the other players’ costs.
The Pareto-frontier contains the Pareto-efficient profiles, i.e.
those not Pareto-inferior to any other. In the ClubMED game,
ingress costs affect the Pareto-efficiency (because of the Gd
pure externality). In particular, given many Nash equilibria,
the Pareto-superiority strictly depends on Gd. E.g., Fig. 3
depicts two cases with 3 links and their strategic forms (Gc
is not considered). The exponent indicates the corresponding
potential value. Egress costs are close to the egress points,
while ingress costs to the communities. For the upper case,
there is a single equilibrium, (l2, l2). For the lower one, there
are four equilibria, and (l3, l1) is the single Pareto-superior
one; however, it is not Pareto-efficient, but Pareto-inferior to
(l1,l3) that is not an equilibrium because AS I will always
prefer l2 or l3 to l1 (11 < 13). This is due to the external effect
of Gd. Indeed, it is possible that, after an iterated reduction of
strategies, G assumes the form of a Prisoner-dilemma game,
in which equilibria are Pareto-inferior to other profiles.
Note 1: To explicate P in calculus, we use a form in which we
set to 0 the minimum of φs and ψs, i.e., Ps(x0, y0) = 0 where:
φs(x0) ≤ φs(x) ∀x ∈ X , and ψs(y0) ≤ ψs(y) ∀y ∈ Y .
Note 2: In the simple example of Fig. 3, all the Nash equilibria
have a null potential value, but this is not the case in general.
B. Modeling of IGP-WO operations
Nowadays, IGP weights are frequently optimized and auto-
matically updated rather than being manually configured. In
this sense, we should assume that the ClubMED costs are
subject to changes when the ingress/egress flow directions
changes. In the following we explain how, in the ClubMED
framework, the coupling among IGP and BGP routing can be
modeled to anticipate the route deflection issue presented in
Sect. II-B. We aim at selecting a robust peering equilibrium
with an approach that is vaguely related somehow to the idea
presented in [15] to stabilize intra-domain routing w.r.t. traffic
pattern variations.




be the (i, j) path cost variations in the egress and ingress
directions (resp.) when passing from the current routing to the
routing profile s ∈ X (idem δi,j,IIs and δj,i,IIs ∗ for AS II). δ
variations could be used to extend the G Nash set and Pareto-
frontier. However, the δ should not be announced via the MED
to avoid a large overhead and an excessive insight in a carrier’s
operations. Each peer can announce just a directional path cost
error. Let εI and εII be these egress cost errors for AS I and
AS II (resp.). Being aware that IGP weights may significantly
















. The ε cost errors represent
a good trade-offs between network information hiding and
coordination requirement: not announcing per-link errors avoid
revealing the δ variations; announcing directed errors (ingress
and egress) allows reflecting the fact that upstream and downs-
tream availability is likely to be unbalanced because of the
bottleneck asymmetry in inter-AS links.
The ε errors induce a larger number of equilibria for the
multipath routing solution. The game can be easily extended to
I\II l1 l2 l3
l1 (17,36)6 (19,32)2 (16,38)8
l2 (15,23)4 (17,19)0 (14,25)6
l3 (18,18)7 (20,14)3 (17,20)9
I\II l1 l2 l3
l1 (16,10)2 (19,10)2 (13,18)8
l2 (14,19)0 (17,19)0 (11,25)6
l3 (14,18)0 (17,18)0 (11,24)6
Fig. 3. 3-link examples.
take into account these error margins. They define a potential
threshold under which a profile becomes an equilibrium. More
precisely, the minimum potential strategies are found, then
the other profiles that have a potential within the minimum
plus the threshold (TP ) are considered as equilibria too. Each
potential difference ΔP from (x1, y1) to (x2, y2) can be
increased of aI(x1, x2) + aII(y1, y2), where aI(x1, x2) =
εI(φs(x1)+φs(x2)) and aII(y1, y2) = εII(ψs(y1)+ψs(y2)).
An optimistic threshold can be:
TP = min
x1,x2∈X
{a(x1, x2)} + min
y1,y2∈Y
{a(y1, y2)} (3)
Indicating with P (x0, y0) the potential minimum, all strategy
profiles (x, y) such that P (x, y) ≤ P (x0, y0) + TP will
be considered as equilibria. This operation can also allow
escaping selfish (endogenous) solutions mainly guided by Gs
+ Gc, introducing Pareto-superior profiles in the Nash set.
IV. PEERING EQUILIBRIUM MULTIPATH (PEMP) POLICIES
Peers would route accordingly to an equilibrium because it
grants a rational stability to the routing decision. The Nash
set and the Pareto-frontier may be quite broad, especially
considering IGP path cost errors. This leads to different pos-
sible Peering Equilibrium MultiPath (PEMP) load balancing
policies (upon these profile sets), which are presented below.
A. Nash Equilibrium MultiPath (NEMP) implicit coordination
Assuming thus that ClubMED remains a fully non-
cooperative framework, its implicit solution strategy to which
to coordinate without any signaling message is: play the
equilibria of the Nash set. Hence, it is feasible to natively
implement a Nash Equilibrium MultiPath (NEMP) routing
policy. E.g, in the bottom of Fig. 3 AS I may balance the
load on l2 and l3, being aware that AS II may balance its load
on l1 and l2. However, the set of equilibria can be shrinked to
the Pareto-superior ones; but many Pareto-superior equilibria
can exist, so the NEMP policy is to be used in this case too.
Please note that there may not exist Pareto-superior equilibria:
in this case, NEMP is performed over all the equilibria.
B. Repeated coordination
Given that the the G Pareto-frontier may not contain equili-
bria, in a repeated ClubMED context, an explicit coordination
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strategy is: play the profiles of the Pareto-frontier. The Club-
MED game would be repeated an indefinite number of times,
indeed. From “folk-theorem”-like results [16], this strategy is
an equilibrium of the repeated game and grants a maximum
gain for the players in the long-run. Nevertheless, the unilateral
trust for such a strategy could decrease whether in a short
period of analysis the gains reveal to be unbalanced and in
favor of a single peer. The reciprocal trust among peers can
thus affect the reliability of such a Pareto coordination.
Unself-Jump: Another strategy is conceivable to guarantee
balancedness in gains in the short term, and thus helping to
keep a high level of reciprocal trust. After shrinking the Nash
set w.r.t. the Pareto-efficiency, for each equilibrium the ASs
might agree to make both a further step towards the best
available strategy profile (xj , yj) such that:
ψ(xj , yj) − ψ(x0, y0) + φ(xj , yj) − φ(x0, y0) < 0 (4)
where (x0,y0) is the starting equilibrium. One AS may un-
selfishly sacrifice for a better bilateral solution: the loss
that one may have moving from the selected equilibrium is
compensated by the improvement upon the other AS. This
strategy makes sense only if the other AS is compensated with
a bigger improvement, and returns the favor the next times.
Pareto-Jump: Instead, with the addition of the constraint:
ψ(xj , yj)− ψ(x0, y0) ≤ 0 ∧ φ(xj , yj)− φ(x0, y0) ≤ 0 (5)
we select a Pareto-superior profile (not necessarily in the
Pareto-frontier), without unselfishly sacrifices. If at least one
(xj , yj) is found we obtain a new profile set that is to be
shrinked w.r.t. the Pareto-superiority for the final solution.
E.g., in the bottom example of Fig. 3, we would jump from
the Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium (l3, l1) to the Pareto-
superior profile (l1, l3). We would not have this jump for the
Unself-Jump policy, that would prefer instead (l1, l1) with a
global gain of 6 instead of “just” 3 with (l1, l3).
Finally, note the last two policies are not binding: it would
be enough to associate the policy with the menace to pass to
one of the more selfish choices. Also note that MEDs from
different ASs should be normalized to the same IGP weight
scale in order to be comparable.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluated the performance of the three PEMP routing
policies with realistic simulations. We created a virtual in-
terconnection scenario among the Geant2 and the Internet2
ASs, depicted in Fig. 6, emulating their existing peering with
three cross-atlantic links. We considered six pairs of inter-cone
flows among the routers depicted with crossed circles. The
TOTEM toolbox [19] was used to run a IGP-WO heuristic,
with a maximum IGP weigth of 50 for both ASs. We used 252
successive traffic samples, oversampling the datasets from [20]
for Geant2 and from [21] for Internet2 on a 8h basis (to cover
all the day times). The original link capacity was scaled by
10 to create an intra-domain congestion risk. The inter-cone
routing generates additional traffic for the traffic matrices. We
used a random inter-cone traffic matrix such that flows are
balanced with 200 Mb/s per direction, which corresponds to
2/3 of the total available peering capacity. To evaluate the
effectiveness of the congestion game we considered peering
links with 100 Mb/s available per direction.
Fig. 4. IGP routing cost Boxplot statistics: NEMP vs BGP Multipath.
Fig. 5. IGP routing cost Boxplot statistics: PEMP strategies.
We compare the PEMP routing policies (‘NEMP’, ‘Pareto-
Frontier’, ‘Pareto-Jump’, ‘Unself-Jump’) to the ‘BGP Mul-
tipath’ solution without and with (‘...+MED’) classical MED
signalling enabled at both sides, and to a ‘Full BGP Multipath’
solution in which all the peering links (i.e., the available
routes) are used for the multipath solution.
A. Routing cost
Fig. 4 reports the IGP routing costs statistics in BoxPlot
format (minimum; box with lower quartile, median, upper
quartile; maximum; outliers). We show four solutions: Full
BGP Multipath, BGP Multipath, the NEMP policy without and
with the congestion game Gc. For each method, we display
the Internet2, the Geant2 and the global routing costs. We
considered two ClubMED solutions, with and without the
congestion game Gc (for the first two figures only).
The full BGP multipath solution obviously guarantees an
even load on all the peering links. However, its routing
cost almost doubles than with normal BGP multipath, which
balances the load only on equal cost paths (egress IGPs or
MEDs). Simple MED usage decreases the cost of the BGP
case without MED, due to one network that is more loaded
(hence, higher IGP weights), and to the fact that with the MED
the chance of ECMP is higher (not only on equal IGP path
cost routes, but also on equal MED routes). The ClubMED
solution, instead, outperforms BGP with a median cost lower
by 10% without Gc, and by 6,6% in its complete form.
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Fig. 6. Internet2 - Geant2 peering scenario with 3 peering links.
Fig. 7. Number of route deflections.
Fig. 5 compares the four PEMP policies. With respect to
NEMP, the Pareto policies give statistically very close results.
This may sound disappointing: one may expect more from
the Pareto-frontier and the Pareto-Jump policies. By analyzing
the results in detail, we verified that the reason of this poor
performance is that the Pareto-frontier often contains strategy
profiles with the least cost for a peer and very high cost for
the other peer. Such strategy profiles are not marked as Pareto-
inferior because of the single peer’s least cost and thus belong
to the Pareto-frontier. Such situations are likely to be frequent
since an uncongested intra-domain link may produce a IGP
weight much lower than the others thus affecting the G profile
cost components. This risk is augmented in the Pareto-Jump
policy since the new selected profiles can “just” be Pareto-
superior: they do not necessarily belong to the Pareto-frontier.
However, for the Pareto-jump policy the median, the minimum
and the upper and lower quartiles outperform the NEMP result;
in fact, the starting Nash set for its Pareto-improvement is the
NEMP one (see Sect. IV-B). Finally, the Unself-Jump policy
should outperform or equalize the Pareto-Jump one w.r.t. the
routing cost since, without (5), it can be see as its relaxation.
Indeed, as reported in Fig. 5, the Unself-Jump gives a median
cost roughly 3% inferior than the NEMP cost.
B. Route deflections
Fig. 7 reports the statistics of routing changes with respect
to the previous round (with an upper bound equal to the total
number of flows). The PEMP policies behave significantly
better than BGP Multipath: they have a median of around
Fig. 8. Maximum peering link utilization boxplot statistics.
3 route deflections against 5, and the upper quartile and
the maximum much lower. Interestingly, among the PEMP
policies, the Pareto-frontier one statistically behaves better
than the other policies for all the criteria but for the minimum.
The reason may be that the Pareto-superiority condition -
applied on a very large set of candidate profiles (in fact,
n2m = 531441) - offers a finer selection than the approximate
potential threshold one. Finally, the Jump policies present a
lower route stability w.r.t. all the statistical criteria. This is
reasonably due to the fact that the jump from the Nash set,
i.e., the unself and Pareto-superior conditions, are computed
in the simulations without considering the cost errors.
C. Peering link congestion
Fig. 8 reports the Boxplot statistics maximum link utiliza-
tion as seen by each peer, with all the methods. All the PEMP
strategies but the Pareto-frontier one never caused congestion
on peering links (utilization above 100%). The enabling of
the Multipath mode in BGP does not have a significant effect
on the peering link congestion. With ClubMED, instead, the
multipath routing choice is carefully guided toward efficient
solutions. The NEMP, Pareto-Jump and Unself-Jump policies
show the median, the upper and lower quartiles always above
85%, remembering that with full BGP Multipath one would
have a 200/300 = 66, 7% utilization. The Pareto-frontier
strategy does not guarantee, however, a congestion-free so-
lution, with a median close to 100% utilization. The reason
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Fig. 9. PEMP strategies execution time.
Fig. 10. Nash set dynamics.
for this behavior are still the highly asymmetric cost profiles
introduced by the Pareto-superiority condition in the solution.
D. Time complexity
Fig. 9 reports the PEMP execution time. We know that the
Pareto-frontier computation is cumbersome, with a O(n2m)
time complexity, while the other policies have a polynomial
complexity that asymptotically depends on the minimization
of a (mono-dimension) potential function to populate the Nash
set. In fact, the other policies have an average computation
time below the 2 seconds (however, rare peaks of a few more
seconds appear, probably due to the cases with very large Nash
set, as it can be see cross-checking with Fig. (10). Hence, only
the NEMP, Pareto-Jump and Unself-Jump policies shall be
considered for a practical implementation. We have, however,
introduced the Pareto-frontier case for a thorough comparison.
E. Nash equilibrium dynamics
Fig. 10 reports the number of equilibria and those Pareto-
superior in a log-scale for all the rounds. The Pareto-
superiority condition permits to pick a few efficient Nash equi-
libria over broad sets, whose dimension varies significantly in
time. This reveals a high sensibility to the routing costs due
to the endogenous effect of Gc with high congestion costs.
VI. SUMMARY
We modeled the routing on peering links as a non-
cooperative game with the aim to allow carriers fine-selecting
routes for critical flows by following efficient equilibrium
multipath solutions. We presented the mathematical model of
the game, composed of a selfish game (with egress IGP costs),
a dummy game (with ingress IGP costs) and a congestion
game. The game components can be adapted to consider IGP
cost variations due to IGP-WO re-optimizations.
We proposed a low-computational way to compute the Nash
equilibria, and four possible Peering Equilibrium MultiPath
(PEMP) routing coordination policies. The first twos cor-
responds to balance the load on the Pareto-superior Nash
equilibria of the one-shot game, and on the Pareto-frontier
(equilibrium of the repeated game), respectively. The latter
two policies correspond to improve the first strategy moving
from the Pareto-superior Nash set refinement toward exterior
Pareto-superior and unselfish routing profiles, respectively.
We simulated the PEMP policies with a realistic emula-
tion, comparing them to BGP Multipath. The results show
they outperforms BGP Multipath in terms of routing cost,
route stability and peering link congestion. In particular, the
route stability is significantly improved and the peering link
congestion can be practically avoided. Some differences exist
between the PEMP policies. Namely, the Pareto-frontier one
is extremely complex and shall not be implemented. The
other ones present some trade-offs but represent all promising
solutions to perform an efficient and rational routing across
peering links. In particular, the Unself-Jump policy represents
the best trade-off between peering trust insurance, routing cost,
congestion control, routing stability and execution time.
We are currently working on the definition of an extended
peering framework, modeling the border with multiple ASs as
the single border of a classical peering.
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